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Chris Marshall
Introduction
In the opening pages of his recent book Crime, Punishment, 
and Restorative Justice, American author Ross London 
tells of what prompted him to embark on the journey 
of discovery that led to the writing of the book.1 After 
more than 25 years of professional involvement in the 
criminal justice system as an attorney, a public defender 
and a municipal judge, London found himself asking the 
question: ‘Is this the best we can do?’
Restoring What?  
The practice, promise and perils of  
restorative 
justice  
in New Zealand The conventional justice system, he knew, has its merits. Evolving over centuries, it has proved reasonably effective in 
keeping crime under tolerable levels of 
control, while at the same time giving 
place to an ever-expanding body of basic 
human rights. Yet, reflecting on personal 
experience London was left, even on his 
better days, with a hollow feeling inside, 
a feeling that the system was not actually 
achieving much good at all.
Despite the efforts of many brilliant 
minds and the expenditure of 
vast sums, we have managed to 
create a criminal justice system 
that transforms innumerable 
personal misfortunes into yet 
other calamities. Victims, who have 
suffered the trauma of crime, enter 
the portals of this system with high 
expectations of justice, only to 
find themselves wandering its halls 
feeling bewildered, unfulfilled, and 
used. For those accused of a crime, 
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entry into the system portends the 
beginning of a personal nightmare 
of dehumanization, ruinous financial 
losses, and unending suspicion … As 
a criminal justice professional, I came 
in contact with hundreds of human 
beings caught up in this labyrinth. 
Time and again, I saw the same look 
of despair on those who emerged 
from the process, embittered, 
exhausted, and defeated. (London, 
2011, p.1)
Pondering this dismal state of affairs, 
London decided that the American 
criminal justice system is ‘fundamentally 
flawed’. The problem is not with the 
people who administer the system. 
Judges, he notes, with precious few 
exceptions are no fools. The problem is 
with the adversarial nature of the system 
itself, with its ‘winner takes all’ approach 
to litigation in which success for one side 
invariably means defeat for the other, 
and a defeat of sometimes crushing 
proportions. 
It seemed to me that, in devoting 
all of its efforts to the tasks of 
determining culpability and 
imposing sanctions, the criminal 
justice system had succeeded in 
becoming an efficient instrument for 
condemnation and exclusion, but 
had utterly failed as an instrument 
of healing and reconciliation. The 
system that had evolved as a powerful 
instrument for apprehending 
criminals, assessing blame, and 
imposing punishment was oddly 
indifferent to the need of the victim, 
the offender, and the community to 
break the cycle of crime, blame, and 
punishment. (ibid., pp.2-3)
Searching for answers, London took 
himself back to graduate school to study 
criminology. Criminologists, he found, 
had lots of interesting things to say 
about crime, but shared little agreement 
on its causes or on how best to reduce 
it. Detached from the real world of 
legal practice, they proposed theories of 
punishment that bore no relation to ‘the 
reality of sentencing practice I had seen 
in every courtroom I had ever entered’ 
(p.5). He also found that, as a breed, 
criminologists tended to be even more 
cynical and confrontational than are the 
most hardened trial attorneys.
But some good did come of 
his induction into criminology: he 
encountered the work of Howard Zehr 
and John Braithwaite and their ‘beguiling’ 
notion of restorative justice. Immersing 
himself in their writings, and of others in 
the so-called restorative justice movement 
– which he characterises as ‘a veritable 
“Noah’s ark” of criminal justice critics, 
idealists, and reformers’2 – London 
concluded that ‘the original visionaries 
of restorative justice have bequeathed to 
the world a wonderful gift: an idea to 
transform criminal justice as we know it’ 
(pp.6, 269). It is an idea that has ‘engaged 
the energies and excited the hopes of 
criminal justice reformers throughout the 
world over the last several decades’, and 
will continue to do so (p.315). But it is 
also an idea, London says, whose potential 
remains seriously under-realised – partly 
because of the ideological blind spots 
and romantic illusions of some of its 
proponents, and partly because restorative 
theorists are yet to adequately bridge the 
gap between informal justice (that is, the 
private justice of personal encounters 
between individuals in conflict) and 
formal justice (the demands of the public 
justice system, which must operate in the 
interests of society as a whole) (p.20, cf. 
pp.41-56, 161-206). Until it finds a way to 
reconcile these two domains, restorative 
justice risks remaining on the sidelines 
of the criminal justice system, doomed 
ultimately to irrelevance and marginality.
To help overcome this dilemma, 
London offers his own recipe for how 
restorative justice can move ‘from the 
margins to the mainstream’. Some of his 
proposals are peculiar to the American 
system, and there are features of his 
analysis with which I would take issue. But 
in building his case London introduces 
one fresh, overarching concept to the 
debate that I have found particularly 
helpful, and to which I will return in due 
course. First, however, let me locate the 
debate in a broader historical context.
Emergence of restorative justice
The whakapapa of the restorative justice 
movement is complex and disputed, with 
different scholars tracing its emergence 
to different influences. This is hardly 
surprising. Social reform movements 
nearly always have fibrous root systems 
rather than a single taproot: they are 
shaped by a wide array of historical forces 
and draw sustenance from a diversity of 
sources. Nonetheless, a good case can 
be made for commencing the modern 
restorative justice story in Canada in 1974, 
where a Mennonite probation officer, 
Mark Yantze, and a volunteer prison 
worker, Dave Worth, with permission 
from the sentencing judge took two young 
men who had vandalised 22 properties 
in their small town to meet their victims 
to discuss reparation and to offer to do 
community work. After the meetings, 
the judge ordered the youths to pay 
restitution to the victims as a condition of 
probation. 
That experience led to the birth of 
the first ‘victim offender reconciliation 
program’ – or VORP – which was 
established in Kitchener, Ontario in 1976, 
and two years later in Elkhart, Indiana. As 
the name suggests, the aim of VORP was 
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... a good case can be made for commencing the 
modern restorative justice story [is] Canada in 
1974, where a Mennonite probation officer, Mark 
Yantze, and a volunteer prison worker, Dave Worth, 
... took two young men ... to meet their victims to 
discuss reparation and to offer to do community 
work.
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to bring victims and offenders together, 
with a mediator, to talk about the wrong 
that had been done and to discuss how it 
could be repaired, thus hopefully paving 
the way for reconciliation to occur. 
Intellectual capital for this new approach, 
which was soon being replicated elsewhere 
in America, came principally from 
the work of criminal justice historian 
Howard Zehr. In the training manuals, 
promotional materials and other 
literature Zehr produced, a new way of 
thinking and talking about the problem 
of crime and the requirements of justice 
began to take shape, though it was not 
initially called ‘restorative justice’.
The programme flourished over 
the next 15 years, and began to attract 
international attention, especially after 
the publication of Zehr’s influential 1990 
book Changing Lenses: a new focus for 
crime and justice. In 1994 the victim–
offender mediation process was endorsed 
by the American Bar Association, and 
the following year by the National 
Association for Victim Assistance. By the 
end of the 1990s the idea of restorative 
justice had become familiar to criminal 
justice reformers and scholars all around 
the world, and it is today considered one 
of the most fertile fields of criminological 
thought. It has been called one of the ‘big 
ideas’ in contemporary justice studies, 
and even the most significant innovation 
in the administration of justice since 
the emergence of the nation state (see 
Marshall, 2012, pp.4-7, 301-3; also 
Johnstone, 2012, pp.1-8, 133-59).
 What began, then, as a trickle near 
Toronto has since become a torrent. There 
are over 400 victim–offender mediation 
schemes in the United States alone, and 
a comparable number in Europe. It 
is estimated that similar programmes 
now exist in over 100 countries, with 
more and more governments showing 
interest in the potential of restorative 
justice to curtail crime and reduce its 
costs to society. Significant multinational 
bodies, such as the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe and the European 
Union, have issued conventions calling 
on member states to develop restorative 
options and specifying standards of good 
practice. Academic engagement with the 
subject has also exploded. There are now 
hundreds of scholars working in the field, 
dozens of conferences held every year, 
and mountains of secondary literature 
that grow higher by the day.
The speed with which all this has 
happened is quite extraordinary. Clearly 
there is something about the idea of 
reframing or reimagining the criminal 
justice problem in relational and reparative 
terms, rather than in solely legal and 
retributive terms, that has resonated with 
people all around the globe. The reason it 
has done so, I suspect, is that the notion 
of restorative justice signals that justice is 
about concrete change. It is not just about 
abstract principles, or legal doctrines, or 
human rights, or metaphysical beliefs; it 
is about changing things on the ground. 
True justice restores what has been lost; 
it rectifies or repairs what has been 
broken; it transforms people’s lived 
experience. That way of conceiving of 
justice intuitively makes sense to people, 
even if they do not know how to define it, 
or describe it, or achieve it in practice.
New Zealand’s chapter in the story
Within this larger narrative of origins 
Aotearoa New Zealand has its own 
chapter to tell. This, too, is a complex and 
perhaps disputed story, which there is no 
space to lay out in detail here. But two 
key ‘moments’ are worth noting. The first 
was the passing in 1989 of the Children, 
Young Persons and Their Families Act, 
which mandated the use of so-called 
‘family group conferences’ – or FGCs 
– for all young offenders (except those 
guilty of murder or manslaughter). This 
was an entirely new mechanism, intended 
to, among other things, recognise the 
rights of children, honour Treaty of 
Waitangi obligations, and allow families 
to take leadership in dealing with the 
transgressions and needs of their young 
people. It was not, as is sometimes 
claimed, a conscious attempt to recover 
Mäori customary practices for dealing 
with family or tribal conflict; rather it 
was a bureaucratic endeavour to provide 
a simpler, more flexible, and culturally 
more appropriate way of processing 
young offenders. 
It was also not a conscious attempt to 
introduce restorative justice philosophy 
into the mainstream system. The working 
party that crafted the legislation had no 
awareness of restorative justice theory 
as it was emerging overseas. It was only 
after Youth Court judge Fred McElrea 
encountered Howard Zehr’s work during 
a period of sabbatical leave in England in 
1993 that FGCs began to be hailed as an 
internationally unique example of state-
sponsored restorative justice, and on a 
colossal scale. Whether that is true or 
not depends on how strictly one defines 
restorative justice. But there can be little 
doubt that the participatory, whänau-
based format of the FGCs was well suited 
to producing restorative outcomes, and 
the impact of the new system in reducing 
incarceration rates of young people was 
dramatic. Many other countries have 
since followed New Zealand’s lead in 
this innovation, and we are still regarded 
internationally, rightly or wrongly, as 
something of a mecca for good youth 
justice policy (MacRae and Zehr, 2004; 
Lynch, 2012).
The second key moment in the New 
Zealand story was in 1994 when Judge 
McElrea invited the Reverend Douglas 
Mansill, a Presbyterian minister in 
Auckland, to facilitate the first adult 
restorative justice conference, based on 
the FGC precedent. Other conferences 
soon followed, and within the space 
... [a New Zealand] Youth Court judge Fred McElrea 
encountered Howard Zehr’s work ... in 1993 that 
FGCs began to be hailed as an internationally 
unique example of state-sponsored restorative 
justice, and on a colossal scale. 
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of a few years community groups of 
voluntary facilitators, beginning with Te 
Oritenga in Auckland, had sprung up 
all over the country, offering restorative 
justice services to their local courts, with 
the support of sympathetic judges. This 
remarkable groundswell of community-
based activism, together with the backing 
of key political and judicial figures, led 
to a four-year-long court-referred pilot 
scheme trialling the use of restorative 
justice conferencing for adult offenders 
in four district courts (2001–04). It also 
enabled the incorporation of the first 
explicit reference to restorative justice 
in four key pieces of legislation: the 
Sentencing Act 2002, the Parole Act 2002, 
the Victims’ Rights Acts 2002 and the 
Corrections Act 2004. Over the ten years 
since, government has continued to fund 
the provision of adult restorative justice 
services through community providers at 
a fairly modest level. But there has been a 
notable increase in commitment over the 
past couple of years, including Ministry 
of Justice support for moving boldly into 
the two most challenging areas of practice 
(both excluded from the pilot): those of 
sexual offending and family violence. 
A great deal more could be said about 
the current restorative justice scene in 
New Zealand. There are some facets that 
are unique to us, especially with respect 
to the Treaty context which frames how 
we must wrestle with justice issues in this 
society. But most of what is happening in 
New Zealand is characteristic of ‘second 
wave’ trends in restorative justice interna-
tionally. 
Two of these trends are worth 
highlighting, because both raise 
fundamental issues of principle. The first is 
the ever-widening range of application of 
restorative justice principles and practices, 
which creates significant problems for 
defining the field and distinguishing its 
normative features. The question ‘What is 
restorative justice?’ is actually becoming 
harder, not easier, to answer as time 
passes. The second trend is the mounting 
interest governments are taking in 
restorative justice, which raises the knotty 
issue of how restorative justice can be 
integrated into the mainstream system of 
social control and punishment without 
compromising its ideals or blunting its 
radical edge. Both these trends are widely 
discussed in the academic literature, and 
in the practitioner community, so let me 
say something more about each.
An expanded field of application
Perhaps the most striking development 
over recent decades has been the 
substantial increase in the range of 
application of restorative justice principles 
and procedures, both within the criminal 
justice system and beyond it. Within the 
system, restorative justice has always been 
predominantly used for young offenders 
and for offences of a relatively minor 
nature. This is partly because it has been 
much easier to commend restorative 
priorities to politicians and policy makers 
in this space, in view of the long-standing 
belief that youngsters who offend, because 
of their immaturity, require interventions 
of care and support, not merely of 
punishment. But, while remaining most 
firmly rooted in the youth jurisdiction, 
there has been a progressive expansion of 
restorative justice into the adult domain 
as well, and with respect to crimes of the 
most serious nature. 
In fact, contrary to what most 
people assume, research confirms what 
practitioners know to be true from 
experience: namely, that restorative 
justice is most effective when the crime 
is most serious. The greater the trauma 
involved, the more powerful restorative 
approaches can be (Strang and Sherman, 
2007, pp.21, 37, 68, 70, 75). Indeed, in the 
most recent survey of research, published 
in November 2013, the authors conclude 
that ‘there can be high confidence of 
good results with violent crime, and 
somewhat less confidence with property 
crime’, so that the common strategy of 
‘banishing restorative justice conferences 
to low-seriousness crimes is a wasted 
opportunity. If governments wish to fund 
restorative justice at all, this evidence 
suggests the best return on investment 
will be with violent crimes, and also 
with offenders convicted after long 
prior histories of convictions’ (Strang et 
al., 2013, p.48; also Joudo Larsen, 2014, 
pp.vii, 10, 23, 32, 33).
As well as an expanded reach within 
the justice system, there has also been 
a remarkable outward ‘migration’ of 
restorative practices into other spheres 
of social life, where they have been used 
to address more everyday problems: 
disruptive behaviour in schools, anti-
social activities in the community, 
interpersonal conflicts and employment 
grievances in the workplace, incidents of 
abuse in residential and daycare facilities, 
misconduct in sports teams, disputes 
between neighbours and community-
level conflicts, disciplinary procedures in 
the armed forces, student misconduct in 
higher education, and complaints against 
corporate bodies for non-compliance with 
regulatory schemes. The application to 
schools has been particularly impressive 
and inspirational. There has also been a 
migration ‘upwards’ from the domestic 
sphere to the sociopolitical sphere, where 
restorative practices have been used to 
deal with episodes of political violence, 
gross violations of human rights, hate 
crimes, ethnic conflict and genocide, and 
the destructive legacy of historical wrongs, 
such as slavery, racial discrimination and 
colonial land confiscations. 
Each of these new spheres of 
application has unique challenges. But 
Some theorists place predominant emphasis on 
the noun ‘justice’, and limit restorative justice 
to a particular way of pursuing justice after the 
occurrence of a crime, one which focuses on a 
respectful, facilitated encounter between victim 
and offender.
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in every case the concept of a justice 
that remediates, not merely retaliates 
has provided a constructive new lens 
for viewing the issues at stake and for 
developing a range of distinctive processes 
to address them.
Problems of definition
But distinctive in what way? What qualifies 
some practice or procedure or perspective 
as restorative justice? How should the 
term be defined and what limits should 
apply to its application? There has never 
been full agreement on this issue, and 
it has become more contentious than 
ever.3 Some theorists place predominant 
emphasis on the noun ‘justice’, and limit 
restorative justice to a particular way of 
pursuing justice after the occurrence of a 
crime, one which focuses on a respectful, 
facilitated encounter between victim 
and offender. Others give more force to 
the adjective ‘restorative’ and broaden 
the designation to include any approach 
to human conflict that promotes 
collaborative decision-making and peace-
building in place of antagonism, coercion 
and exclusion. Some widen it even further 
to embrace a whole way of viewing the 
world and living within it ‘restoratively’, in 
every department of life.4
Rather than choosing between these 
options, or abandoning the label as now so 
inclusive as to be meaningless, it is better to 
envisage a continuum between minimalist 
and maximalist conceptions of restorative 
justice. The spectrum ranges from those 
who restrict the category to a particular 
criminological procedure, at one pole, to 
those who apply it to an entire way of life 
at the other, with applications to personal, 
political and professional conflicts falling 
at points in between (Johnstone, 2012, 
p.157). Within each application there is 
also a continuum between interventions 
that are minimally restorative and those 
that are maximally restorative. Practice 
models, for example, which work solely 
with one party to an offence – be it the 
victim, offender, or those secondarily 
caught in the slipstream – will only be par-
tially restorative in effect, whereas models 
that enable all the parties involved to col-
laborate on devising a mutually beneficial 
solution have the potential to be maximal-
ly restorative (Zehr, 2002, pp.54-7).
For all its fluidity and multiplicity 
of uses, there remains something 
recognisably distinctive about a restorative 
framework for approaching personal and 
social harms, something that marks it 
out as different from business as usual; 
something that sets it apart from both 
retributive and rehabilitative approaches 
that have long dominated the penal 
landscape. Restorative justice shares 
with retributivism a concern to rectify 
the imbalances created by crime in a 
morally serious manner, and it resembles 
utilitarianism in its rejection of avoidable 
suffering in the quest for resolution. 
Where it departs from both, however, is 
in the thoroughgoing ‘relationalism’ of 
its undergirding concepts of justice and 
justice making. The distinctiveness of 
these concepts is easiest to describe in 
criminal justice terms, but the analysis 
can be extended by analogy to other 
domains as well. 
Three core convictions
Restorative justice practice is informed 
or controlled by three core convictions 
or foundational assumptions. The first 
is an understanding of crime as injury 
more than infraction. Crime is not viewed 
simply as the breaking of the law, or the 
transgressing of some moral or spiritual 
code; it is the harming of actual persons, 
the infliction of real personal losses, the 
tearing of the web of relationships that 
interconnect us in society: the wounding, 
indeed, of our very humanity. Not all 
harms are crimes, of course, and not 
all crimes cause equal harm. But what 
fundamentally marks out crime as wrong 
is that it injures, or seriously threatens to 
injure, the persons involved and violates 
their relational integrity.
To speak of crime as injury is not mere 
emotionalism; it is how victims actually 
experience crime and other injustices. 
Victims usually know themselves to be 
victims because they feel violated, not 
because they realise some legal rule has 
been broken. It is the very pain of such 
violation, and the visceral resentment it 
always triggers, that helps us to locate 
the presence of an injustice. Philosophers 
may not be able to agree on how to 
define ‘justice’, but they can usually agree 
on where injustice has occurred. Injustice 
manifests its presence as intentional injury 
to the innocent and as a contemptuous 
disrespect of their rights. That, essentially, 
is what crime is too.
This leads to the second distinguishing 
feature of restorative philosophy: its 
notion of justice as the existence of 
right-relations between persons. The 
injury done through criminal or other 
intentional wrongdoing is fundamentally 
a relational injury. It is the dishonouring 
of the kind of relationship that ought 
exist between the parties as fellow citizens 
and fellow human beings. In her searing 
critique of restorative justice, Canadian 
legal scholar Annalise Acorn identifies 
this as the key idea that sets restorative 
justice apart from other theories of 
justice – its notion of justice as right-
relation and crime as wrong-relation. For 
restorativists, she notes, justice does not 
reside in any second-order tokens, such 
as retributive punishment, nor in any of 
the procedural steps in the restorative 
process, such as personal encounter, 
confession, restitution or forgiveness. 
It inheres rather in the establishment 
of a right-relationship between the 
parties. ‘The justice to be restored is the 
experience of relationships of mutuality, 
equality, and respect in community. And 
... [Annalise Acorn] notes, justice does not reside 
in any second-order tokens, such as retributive 
punishment, nor in any of the procedural steps 
in the restorative process, such as personal 
encounter, confession, restitution or forgiveness. 
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it is this extravagant ambition – this 
understanding of justice in terms of an 
idealised conception of right-relation – 
that is the single distinguishing element 
of restorative justice’ (Acorn, 2004, p.22).
Acorn goes on to object strongly to 
such a conception of justice because it 
sets the bar impossibly high. It requires 
of victims a supererogatory devotion 
to forgiveness and reconciliation, while 
denying them their right to seek a total 
disconnection from their abuser – which 
is what victims of sexual or domestic 
violence, in particular, often want and 
require. ‘They don’t want right-relation’, 
Acorn exclaims. ‘They want no relation. 
And they want to be able to look to a 
powerful and trustworthy state capable 
of prohibiting relation’ (p.116). 
But Acorn misses the point. To speak 
of justice in the wake of crime as the 
recovery of right-relations is not to imply 
the emergence of a new-found intimacy 
and mutuality between the parties. It 
is to suggest, rather, the restoration 
of rightness to their relationship. The 
relationship is righted or rectified or 
‘right-wised’ because the wrongs that 
have blighted it have been exposed and 
dealt with, not because new depths of 
intimacy and respect have arisen. It is 
therefore a healthier relationship than 
it was before and, in that sense, a ‘right’ 
relationship. But it is not necessarily a 
closer or ongoing relationship, which 
may not be the right kind of relationship 
for the parties to have anyway (see further 
Marshall, 2012, pp.302-12). 
This brings us, then, to a third 
distinctive theme in restorative justice 
philosophy: its understanding of justice-
making as repair. If crime injures persons 
at their relational core (including their 
relationship to themselves), and distorts 
the rightful conditions that bind them 
together in community, then justice must 
require the repairing or healing of the 
injury. This is something the punitive 
justice system largely fails to deliver, 
because punishment does little or nothing 
to heal, either the offender or the victim. 
Long ago, George Bernard Shaw put his 
finger on the problem of punishment for 
offenders: ‘If you are to punish a man 
retributively, you must injure him. If you 
are to reform him, you must improve 
him. And men are not improved by 
injuries’ (Shaw, 1961, p.26).
The problem for victims is even 
greater. A system that devotes almost all 
its energies and resources to punishing 
offenders has little left over for victims. It 
may be true in some cases that knowing 
that the person who wronged them 
is being punished may help a victim’s 
emotional recovery (more research is 
needed on this question: see London, 
2011, pp.98-103). But it will only ever 
be of limited help, for punishment itself 
does nothing to redress the physical, 
relational, moral and material dimensions 
of the harm inflicted. Whatever other 
social good the punitive justice system 
may achieve (and there is some), it is 
not empowered to heal. Something more 
powerful than punishment is needed to 
loosen ‘the bond of victimisation’ that 
binds victims and offenders together in 
the pain and shame of the criminal event 
and to bring repair.
Restoring what?
But what, precisely, is this damage that 
needs repair? What does restorative justice 
actually restore? This question may be 
answered in various ways. Some stress the 
role of material and financial restitution, 
the making good of the physical losses 
caused by the crime. Others emphasize 
the rehabilitation of offenders, their 
reintegration into law-abiding society. 
Others speak of the restoration of the 
victim’s dignity, or mana, or sense of 
security and peace of mind. Some deny 
that anything is restored, objecting to any 
suggestion that the clock can be turned 
back and the past retrieved. There are 
some losses that can never be made good, 
such as the life of a murder victim, or 
the independence of someone disabled 
by a drunk driver, or the innocence of a 
child subjected to sexual abuse; and even 
lesser offences change things for ever. 
Others object to the implication that 
justice is being restored, since justice may 
never have existed in the first place. As I 
was frequently asked in Taiwan, how can 
you have restorative justice in an unjust 
society? What is needed is not a return to 
some imaginary justice of the past, but a 
transformative justice that works for social 
change.
Clearly, then, the phrase itself is 
ambiguous. But, to my mind, what is 
fundamentally in need of repair are the 
relationships violated by the wrong. This 
includes the relationship between victim 
and offender, and also the relationships 
each has to others in their wider social 
group which have also been affected. 
These relationships are not being restored 
to what they were before; they are being 
restored to ‘rightness’, to what they ought 
to be like in the circumstances. Even if the 
parties never knew each other personally 
prior to the crime, their co-participation 
in the criminal event has created a 
relationship between them, an unhealthy 
and destructive relationship that needs 
to be restored to a rightful condition. 
The same applies to all the other layers 
of relations that constitute us as social 
creatures, since we are relational beings 
all the way down. 
Because interpersonal relationships are 
reciprocal and storied realities, one of the 
most effective ways to initiate change is 
by means of direct or mediated encounter 
between the parties: a meeting where the 
story of the damage done through the 
... a meeting where the story of the damage 
done through the collision of their lives in the 
wrongful event is told as truthfully and fully and 
compassionately as possible, and where all those 
directly affected together decide what is needed to 
write a new chapter ... 
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collision of their lives in the wrongful 
event is told as truthfully and fully and 
compassionately as possible, and where 
all those directly affected together decide 
what is needed to write a new chapter in 
the saga, so that the relationship can be 
restored to rightness. That is the heart of 
restorative justice.
Restoring trust
Before finishing, I want to return to Ross 
London’s work which I mentioned at the 
outset, both because it serves to sharpen 
the focus even further on what restorative 
justice restores, and because it does so in a 
way that has direct bearing on that second 
big trend I noted in restorative justice 
internationally, the growing interest of 
governments in the approach.
In his somewhat protracted analysis, 
London is often quite critical of the 
rhetoric surrounding restorative justice 
in the literature. He especially dislikes 
the common claim that it is an entirely 
‘new paradigm’ for doing justice, 
fundamentally incommensurate with the 
values of the prevailing system (pp.262-
72, cf. pp.13-22). To assert, as proponents 
often do, that restorative justice is both 
a new paradigm and the recovery of 
ancient or indigenous ways of achieving 
justice is self-contradictory. It can’t be 
both. It is also self-defeating. Exaggerated 
claims of novelty will only serve to 
keep the practice on the margins of the 
mainstream justice system, as an exotic 
diversionary strategy for petty offending 
rather than as a comprehensive model for 
systemic change.
Yet, while denying that it is a wholly 
new paradigm, London still thinks 
there is something genuinely new about 
restorative justice. Its greatest innovation 
is not its creation of a new set of criminal 
justice practices, such as victim–offender 
mediation or family group conferences. 
What is ‘wholly original and crucial’ is 
its goal of repairing the harm of crime. 
‘Whereas the traditional goals of the 
criminal justice system are to deter, 
censure, incapacitate, and rehabilitate 
offenders, restorative justice poses an 
entirely new and original goal: repairing 
the harm of crime’ (p.24).
What, then, London asks, is the 
harm that needs to be repaired? I have 
made a case for seeing it as the damage 
done to the relationships that bind us 
together in society and comprise our 
essential humanity. But London finds 
that explanation too generic and abstract. 
It doesn’t help us, for example, to 
distinguish between the kind of relational 
damage caused by crime and the kind 
caused by non-criminal wrongs, such as 
jealousy, insensitivity, gossiping and so 
on. It is better, he thinks, to see relational 
damage as the result of the harm, not as 
the harm itself. The real harm associated 
with the commission of crime is the loss 
of trust. It is the betrayal of the most basic 
expectations we have of our fellow human 
beings – which is, put simply, to live by 
the negative form of the Golden Rule, 
‘not to do unto others as you would not 
have them do unto you’. If we are to live 
together in security and peace we need 
to trust that everyone will abide by this 
rule, that they will not to try to overcome 
our will through fear or force or fraud. 
Crime confounds this expectation. Crime 
shows that we can no longer trust the 
person who has broken the rules and 
threatened our safety. The wrongdoer has 
proven themself to be ‘untrustworthy’, an 
outsider to the law-abiding community. 
What is most needed, then, in the 
wake of crime is to regain trust in the 
offender. Not a perfect trust, but a basic 
trust that he or she will respect the rights, 
feelings and values of others and regulate 
his or her behaviour without the need 
of external coercion. Offenders must 
prove their readiness to be readmitted to 
the moral community by showing their 
trustworthiness again. 
The virtue of focusing on the 
restoration of trust rather than the 
restoration of right relations, London 
suggests, is that it does not presume 
the existence of a previous or ongoing 
personal relationship with the offender; it 
simply presumes the minimal expectation 
that he or she will play by the same rules, 
so that society can accommodate their 
presence without fear or force. Of course, 
even this minimal expectation still 
presupposes relationship. Mutual trust 
is meaningless outside of a relational 
context. Even if the parties to a crime 
had no previous personal relationship, 
in so far as their common membership 
of society necessitates mutual trust they 
were still in relationship.
That said, I am persuaded that there 
is much to be gained from focusing 
specifically on the relational component 
of trust. It helps to explain, for example, 
the power of the central elements of 
restorative justice dialogue, such as 
story-telling, accountability, emotional 
honesty, apology, restitution, community 
engagement and commitment to moral 
change. These are precisely the things 
needed to heal breaches of trust and 
restore relationships to rightness.
Even more telling is the way trust 
functions as the common property of 
both personal and social relationships. 
The trust of personal relationships 
depends on having subjective knowledge 
of the individual to be trusted. The trust 
of social relationships, on the other hand, 
requires an objective confidence that the 
wider social order will operate predictably 
and fairly according to agreed-upon 
standards, and that even strangers will 
hold themselves accountable to the 
Golden Rule. 
One critical prerequisite for the 
existence of social trust is confidence that 
the state will act to redress the breaches 
of trust that occur through criminal 
offending and enforce the standards of 
behaviour encoded in the law. If the state 
fails to do so it denies its own legitimacy. 
All members of society, therefore, have 
a legitimate interest in seeing crime 
All members of society, ... have a legitimate interest 
in seeing crime prosecuted and punished, as a 
necessary precondition for the existence of social 
trust. 
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prosecuted and punished, as a necessary 
precondition for the existence of social 
trust. This is one of government’s primary 
responsibilities, one that some restorative 
justice advocates are too quick to decry. 
Rather than disparaging the punitive 
system root and branch, they should 
affirm the state’s obligation to sustain the 
reservoirs of social and personal trust in 
society, and commend restorative justice 
as a promising new tool for doing so 
more effectively.
Towards a restorative justice system
London’s chief concern is to find a way of 
straddling the divide between the informal 
justice of victim–offender encounter and 
the formal justice of the public system. 
The key to unifying these two domains, 
he believes, is to understand both as ways 
of serving the larger goal of restoring 
trust. The criminal justice system exists 
to uphold the necessary conditions for 
social trust. This requires it to employ all 
the procedural safeguards enshrined in 
the mainstream retributive system, such 
as due process, just deserts, equal access, 
predictability, proportionality, consistency 
and so on. These principles help to satisfy 
society’s need for certainty and security. 
But within these objective parameters 
judges still need to address the problem of 
personal trust attaching to the individual 
offender. In sentencing, judges should be 
guided, London suggests, by three simple 
but penetrating questions: Why don’t I 
trust this person to re-enter society right 
now? What must he or she do, and over 
what period of time, to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness? And what evidence do I 
have to help me answer these questions? 
(p.55).
While the lawful imposition of 
punishment may be necessary to sustain 
social trust, he writes, punishment by 
itself is ‘an extraordinarily poor way of 
restoring trust in either an offender or 
in society’ (p.105, emphasis added). It is 
only when punishment is accompanied 
by such ‘indicia of trust’ as acceptance 
of blame, empathy, remorse, apology 
and restitution that evidence exists for 
rebuilding personal trust.5 This is where 
restorative justice has a powerful role to 
play. An offender’s willingness to engage 
in a dialogue with his victims, and with 
the community he has betrayed, provides 
a unique setting for honest explanation, 
acceptance of moral responsibility, 
manifestations of empathy, voicing of 
apology, and a commitment to future 
change, all of which are the seeds of 
renewed ‘trustability’. 
Crucially, everything an offender 
does in such a setting to regain trust also 
benefits his victims. As well as meeting 
their needs for information, reassurance 
and vindication, it helps them to restore 
their trust ‘that the world is inhabited 
by people who are much like ourselves: 
people with a conscience, with empathy; 
people who play by the same rules as we do 
and, if they break those rules, understand 
the wrong they have committed and 
accept the agreed-upon consequences of 
their wrongdoing’ (p.105). 
Conclusion
London makes an intriguing case for the 
integration of restorative justice processes 
into the criminal justice system in a 
way that both supports and transforms 
mainstream practice. It supports the 
mainstream system by endorsing its 
necessary function of upholding the rule 
of law and protecting the innocent, and 
it transforms it by proposing a new way 
of understanding the overriding goal of 
sentencing and punishment. ‘Guided by 
the goal of restoring trust in the offender 
and in society’, London writes, ‘we can 
devise a criminal justice system that 
promotes genuine healing, forgiveness, 
and reintegration’ (p.89).
The key to this integration is the 
recognition that the principal harm of 
crime is the loss of trust. This loss is 
only so devastating a problem because 
we are irreducibly social creatures, who 
only ever exist in an intricate network of 
relationships. The malice of intentional 
wrongdoing serves to violate the trust on 
which these relationships depend, and 
when that happens it is the core business 
of restorative justice practice – encounter, 
truth-telling, accountability, confession, 
contrition and restitution – that has 
unrivalled power to begin to heal the 
breach.
Of course, efforts to integrate 
restorative priorities and practices into 
the mainstream justice system, and into 
the social order at large, are not without 
risk. Peril exists on all sides. Restorative 
justice is imperilled by the possibility of 
institutional capture and control, and 
by the dilution of its distinctive values. 
The justice system is in peril of having 
its adherence to procedural fairness and 
equality of outcome compromised by 
idiosyncratic and potentially anarchic 
restorative justice processes. Both threats 
are real, though they may often be 
exaggerated.6 It is my hope that, in this 
wonderful country of ours, ever conscious 
of the perils entailed we may continue to 
work together – as practitioners, policy 
makers, politicians and ordinary citizens 
– to move the vision of restorative justice, 
and all that it promises, from the margins 
of our consciousness to the mainstream 
of how we live together in society, in 
faith, hope and charity. 
1 This article is the edited text of Professor Marshall’s inaugural 
lecture, delivered at Victoria University on 25 March 2014.
2 On restorative justice as a social movement, see Umbreit and 
Peterson Armour (2010), pp.1-33.
3 As Umbreit and Armour (2010, p.318) comment, ‘the 
identification of a program as “restorative” can be confusing 
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specific processes, its programs, or combinations thereof’.
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Trying to transform … society’s response to crime is now 
Of course, efforts to integrate restorative priorities 
and practices into the mainstream justice system, 
and into the social order at large, are not without 
risk. Peril exists on all sides.
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just one concern … of a social movement which aims to 
propagate a new way of seeing the world and living in it’.
5 ‘By voluntarily submitting to a deserved punishment, the 
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not to profit from his freeloading; by his voluntary 
agreement to submit to rehabilitation, he expresses his 
desire for commitment to change; and, finally, by the totality 
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return to the good graces of the moral community’ (London, 
2011, p.83).
6 ‘Commentators have asked whether restorative justice 
practices can co-exist alongside formal criminal justice 
approaches and given the widespread acceptance of 
restorative justice, evident in the expansion of restorative 
justice to encompass adult offenders and more serious 
offences, this question seems to have been answered. 
Restorative justice practices provide an important 
supplement to the sanctions placed on criminal behavior by 
the traditional criminal justice system’ (Joudo Larson, 2014, 
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